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This paper introduces an "index of macroeconomic space"-demonstrating the ability of a country to run a countercyclical fiscal policy or a fiscal stimulus at any point in time-to show how a sample of 20 mostly middle-income countries had entered the 2008 global financial crisis with different initial conditions that, in turn, determined their ability to respond to this crisis. Since 2008, many have implemented expansionary fiscal policies and have used up available macroeconomic space. Most have had to resort to increased borrowing by the public sector, both externally and domestically. This paper-a product of the Economic Policy and Debt Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network-is part of a larger effort in the department to asses the impact of the global financial crisis on the a country's sovereign debt and macroeconomic situations and its implications for inclusive growth. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at rvandoorn@worldbank.org, vsuri@worldbank.org or sgooptu@worldbank.org.
Can the middle-income countries restore their pre-2008 macroeconomic space (to the level given by historical averages of key macroeconomic variables) or contain it from further deterioration in the medium term? In an endeavor to address this question, this paper shows, through illustrative scenarios, that the room to maneuver for some countries is somewhat limited unless they embark on severe, unprecedented fiscal adjustments or they may need more time to do so than current projections seem to suggest.
Introduction
At the eve of the September 2008 global financial crisis that was triggered by the Lehman collapse, most middle-income countries had been facing favorable market conditions and were at a stage where they themselves had improved their debt management capacity, reduced inflation, improved fiscal and current account balances, and accumulated foreign exchange reserves, in part due to sustained implementation of prudent macroeconomic policies between 2002 and 2007 and appropriate structural reforms. However, the crisis revealed differences among them: a number of middle-income countries were in a better condition than in the late 1990s-early 2000s to cope with the impact of the global crisis, while others were left weaker due to internal and external imbalances that emerged and were thus hit harder. This, in turn, affected their ability to respond in 2008 and 2009 and perhaps in the medium term if the global recovery is weak. This paper aims to highlight these differences among a sample of 20 middle-income countries (MICs) with a view to stimulate debate about the way forward in dealing with the ongoing global financial crisis (Table 1) .
2 The 20 countries in the sample are all MICs, except Hungary, which has recently graduated from the MICs, but where the impact of the global financial crisis and aftermath warrants a similar type of analysis. The sample covers both manufactured goods and commodity exporters 3 to ensure that the different initial conditions and transmission channels of the commodity boom-and-bust and the global financial crisis are covered.
The range of countries in this sample is wide-with populations ranging from 10 million (Hungary) to over 1 billion (China and India), GDP from $100 million (Peru) to $3.3 trillion (China) and GDP per capita from $1,700 (Egypt) to $14,000 (Hungary). At the same time, there are important similarities among these countries. Namely, all these countries have tapped international capital markets; they have attracted large amounts of short-term external financing; and are eligible for funding from the nonconcessional window of the World Bank (i.e. IBRD) and other multilateral institutions. They are typically linked to high-income countries by both trade and financial market channels, and the global financial crisis impacted them directly via capital flow reversals, exchange rate pressures, increased borrowing spreads in international credit markets, and indirectly, via commodity prices, exports, portfolio and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and workers' remittances. 4 Section 2 describes the main global and country-specific developments from 2002 to 2007. Section 3 assesses macroeconomic space at the onset of the crisis and the direct impact and response. Section 4 then assesses medium-term fiscal challenges and fiscal adjustment strategies under a number of scenarios. Section 5 concludes.
Developments from 2002 to 2007
Thanks to favorable international market conditions during the period 2002 to 2007 coupled with prudent domestic macroeconomic management most of these MICs were successful in reducing inflation, improving their fiscal and current account balances and building-up foreign exchange reserves. Some countries switched to inflation targeting, and others implemented a well-designed fiscal responsibility framework.
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4 On the other hand, low-income countries (LICs) have been typically hit only via indirect channels such as commodity prices, exports, FDI flows and remittances (only a few have access to international capital markets). Given the typically larger share of income spent on food in LICs compared to MICs, the food and fuel price boom that occurred just before the global financial crisis had a larger and broader impact than in MICs, and weakened their position. Some have benefitted from debt relief, and they rely mostly on long-term concessional funding and grants from multilateral and official bilateral creditors. (Rose, 2006) .. Also, since 2000, 11 countries in the sample, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru and Poland, have implemented fiscal rules. These fiscal rules were either in the form of debt limits, balanced-budget rules, expenditure and revenue rules (See IMF, 2009 ). These rules also varied by level of government, enforcement, and degree of flexibility accorded by the center to sub-national entities. Many countries were able to issue bonds in both foreign and domestic currency, as investors were looking for profitable opportunities (Figure 1 ). This led to record-low spreads on their bond issuances over comparable U.S. Treasuries (Figure 2 ). For some this relatively loose financing environment led to a large build-up of public and private external debt, thereby leading to internal and external imbalances and vulnerabilities down the road.
This period also witnessed commodity price hikes, which disproportionately benefitted commodity exporting MICs. But as food and fuel prices started to reach record highs in late-2007 to mid-2008 (Figure 3 ), a significant gap in the external and fiscal positions between commodity exporters and other countries began to appear. Commodity producing MICs were therefore in a better position to weather the crisis when it struck in 2008.
These favorable market conditions and policy improvements contributed to the observed pre-crisis improvements in domestic indicators in most of these countries. For instance, average inflation came down in most countries, especially, Argentina, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine ( Figure 4 ). In several countries, financial sector development increased the access of its residents to credit. The increase in credit as share of GDP was especially large Hungary and Ukraine ( Figure 5 ). Many countries increased their average fiscal and primary balances (e.g. Chile, Nigeria and Russia). Turkey improved its fiscal balance. This period also saw a decline in gross public indebtedness of these countries (as a share of GDP), partly due to rapid GDP growth. 6 Figure 6 shows the public debt dynamics of the sample of 20 middle-income countries that are examined in this paper. Looking at the debt dynamics for external debt in these countries, we find that for those countries where external debt decreased between 2002 and 2007, it was mainly due to rapid nominal GDP growth, with only a minor role for exchange rate appreciation. 8 In countries that saw a large increase in external debt, it was primarily due to increased borrowing so that debt stocks grew at a faster rate than nominal GDP growth. Here again, the role of exchange rate movements in changes in external debt was somewhat limited. Figure 8 shows the decomposition of the change in external debt for each country in the sample (as a % of GDP) into its three components (namely, external debt ($), nominal GDP (local currency) and the exchange rate) and identifies the relative contribution of each component in logarithmic terms. Specifically, the following definitions are used:
External debt (% of GDP) = [External debt ($) x exchange rate]/GDP (in local currency).
To compute relative changes in a logarithmic scale:
Log [1 + % change in external debt (% of GDP)] = Log[1 + %change in external debt ($)] + Log[1 + %change in exchange rate] -Log[1+%change in GDP (local currency)]
Given the favorable developments that they experienced during the pre-crisis period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , the available "macroeconomic space" improved for many countries. 9 In order to compare countries in this regard, we computed an "index of macroeconomic space" for each country for each year. Details on how this was computed are provided in Box 1. 
Box 1. The Index of Macroeconomic Space
This index of macroeconomic space summarizes variables that have the most influence on a country's ability to implement a countercyclical fiscal policy or a fiscal stimulus program. In order to be able to implement a countercyclical fiscal policy or a fiscal stimulus, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to have low fiscal deficits and low public debt. External or domestic conditions could be a support or constraint on fiscal policy.
For example, if a country already has high inflation, a current account deficit, low reserves, high external debt, or fast growth in credit to the private sector, a fiscal expansion might destabilize the economy. On the other hand, even if a country has been running fiscal deficits and has a high public debt, it might still be able to run a fiscal expansion, as long as markets are confident that the country's debt level will remain on a sustainable path, and that macroeconomic stability is not jeopardized. The non-fiscal components of the index represent some of the variables that markets regularly monitor.
In countries that have low public and external debt, large FX reserves, enjoy low inflation, moderate credit growth, positive or only moderately negative current account and fiscal balances this fiscal expansion will probably have positive macroeconomic benefits (supporting growth, while maintaining internal and external balances). These countries are thought to have macroeconomic space.
In a country with high credit growth to the private sector, the increase in domestic demand might lead to an acceleration in inflation, while it is also a leading indicator for perhaps future calls on fiscal resources due to building up of contingent liabilities in the financial sector. The increase in external demand will lead to deterioration in the balance of payments and might put the exchange rate under pressure. Under a fixed exchange rate, the country will lose FX reserves. These countries are thought to have limited macroeconomic space.
However, in most countries there will be mix of these positive and negative indicators. A country might have a fiscal surplus, but it might still be constrained by high inflation, or low FX reserves and a current account deficit. On the other hand, a prudent country with low inflation and current account surpluses, might be able to (temporarily) sustain higher fiscal deficits and enjoy confidence from the markets.
The index of macroeconomic space consists of the unweighted sum of the seven standardized variables in the table below. These variables have been normalized with the sample mean and standard deviation of the particular year. This means that the distribution of each variable across the sample in 2007 and 2009 is centered around zero with a unit standard deviation. This standardization prevents variables with a typically high numerical value to dominate the index. Also, the exchange rate and domestic interest rate are not included explicitly as variables in this index to account for any endogeneity that may exist among these and the seven standardized variables in the index. Box 1 discusses the "index of macroeconomic space" that is computed for each country in the sample. This index, which is based on three sub-indicators, shows that the macroeconomic space of most countries in the sample has increased between 2002 and 2007. China enjoyed the largest macroeconomic space in the sample, thanks to strong external sub-indicators and favorable fiscal and domestic subindicators. Nigeria's macroeconomic space on the other hand was mostly thanks to its favorable external sub-indicators, such as current account surpluses, high reserves and low debt, offsetting its fast growth of credit to the private sector relative to GDP that might be lead eventually to higher inflationary pressure. Chile's macroeconomic space was almost entirely thanks to its prudent fiscal policy. On the other hand, Hungary had the least macroeconomic space, mainly due to its relatively weak external and fiscal subindicators. In Ukraine, high inflation and weak external sub-indicators were more important, despite having a fiscal sub-indicator that was actually more positive than a few other countries. These were followed by Turkey and Argentina, which had suffered a financial crisis in 2002 ( Figure 9 ).
After an initial panic that hit all countries markets quickly became more discerning…
When the financial crisis became global in September 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the immediate market reaction hit all these MICs across the board via multiple channels. However, data for the quarter that followed showed that markets become more discriminating in their risk assessments across countries as demonstrated by spreads, exchange rates and FX reserves. GDP growth has also suffered in most of these countries and their external debt burdens have increased due to the exchange rate movements.
In September 2008, spreads on sovereign bonds 11 over comparable U.S. Treasuries shot up immediately across this sample of MICs. This was especially so for Argentina, Hungary, Russia and Ukraine. At the 11 Data from the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBI Global), which tracks total returns for US dollar denominated debt instruments issued by emerging market sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities. However, as the initial wave of panic subsided, markets became more discerning, and started to look at the fundamentals of the countries. Spreads started to decrease for most countries, although by March 2009, they had not yet returned to their pre-crisis levels. In Argentina, Hungary and Ukraine, spreads in March 2009 had increased further. Meanwhile, exchange rates had become more stable and some countries' FX reserves had increased again. Hungary's recovery of reserves is thanks to the IMF program in November 2008, which allowed it to increase FX reserves (Figure 11 ). Figure 12 highlights the slowdown in real GDP growth that was experienced in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. Comparing precrisis average peak to trough GDP growth (real year-on-year between Q3 2008 and Q3 2009) all countries in the sample were hit by a slowdown. This was especially so for commodity exporters such as Chile and Russia, and Hungary, Mexico, Turkey and Ukraine. For developing countries as a whole, their economic downturn has been deeper and more broadly based than during previous recessions. IMF (2010b) . See also Appendix 1 of this document for updated information on crisis-related discretionary fiscal stimulus programs in the G20 countries based on a survey of the respective IMF country desks. Countries with a relatively large amount of macroeconomic space at end-2007 typically increased their non-interest expenditure in 2008-09 the most, both as a share of GDP and in real terms. 15 Chile and Russia, which had healthy fiscal sub-indicators, showed the largest increase in non-interest expenditure as a share of GDP. China, on the other hand, showed primarily strong external sub-indicators, but showed a large increase in real non-interest expenditure. 16 While, the increases in fiscal expenditure have certainly helped counteract the drop in other components of aggregate demand, in most cases however, it was unable to prevent a downturn. The new borrowing in response to the crisis, combined with the growth slowdown and exchange rate depreciation, reversed some of the earlier gains from a reduction of external and public debt (as a share of GDP) that these countries had experienced in previous years. shows that non-fiscal variables do play an important role in determining macroeconomic space. 16 It should be noted that only a small portion of China's fiscal stimulus package is visible in the budget data, as most is reflected in bank lending (Vincelette, et al., 2010) ; domestic credit to the private sector surged from 108 percent of GDP in 2008 to 134 percent of GDP in 2009. This represents both the largest increase and the highest level of private credit in the sample, which potentially reduces China's fiscal space to act down the road. The fiscal policy response in 2008 and 2009, and the external support packages that were put together for these countries, have led to higher public ( Figure 15 ) and external debt in several countries. In some countries, such as Hungary, which built up more external debt relative to domestic debt, they now face increased foreign exchange risk. For others, such as Brazil, India, Egypt, which built up more domestic debt relative to external debt, their exchange rate risks are less. This shows that countries would do well to monitor the financial structure and composition of their debt portfolios (Figure 16 ). Looking at the macroeconomic space index at the end of 2009, Nigeria, Thailand, Chile, China are observed to have the largest room to respond to a more prolonged crisis, in Nigeria thanks to its strong external sub-indicator, whereas in the other countries thanks to a more balanced mix of indicators. 17 Hungary, Ukraine were seen to have the least amount of fiscal space in this sample, reflecting both a weak starting point as well as large negative impacts of the crisis.
Looking Ahead
Given these elevated levels of debt after the initial crisis response, the attention of policy makers and capital market participants should shift to the medium term. The World Bank's Global Economic Prospects 2010 concludes that the 2008 global crisis will have a lasting impact on financial markets, raising borrowing costs and lowering levels of credit and international capital flows. It projects that, as countries adjust to tighter global financial conditions, growth of potential output in developing countries may be reduced by between 0.2 and 0.7 percentage points annually over the next five to seven years. Given the depth of the recession and relative weakness of the expected recovery, one may very well see significant spare capacity, high unemployment, and weak inflationary pressures in both high-income and developing countries for some time.
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Key questions that emerge in as a result include: What will happen to public debt if there is no adjustment to the primary balance in the medium term? What kind of fiscal adjustment will the countries need to make in order to either reduce their public debt stock or stabilize it? If the adjustment is deemed too large to be politically credible, what will be the effect of a more gradual adjustment? This section of the paper endeavors to address some of these questions by reporting on the results of four illustrative simulations: a baseline scenario and three alternative scenarios. . The nominal medium-term growth rate is that average projected growth rate from 2010-14. The historical primary balance is the average primary balance from 2002-07. For commodity exporters however the average primary balance was very high thanks to the commodity price boom, and they may not be able to achieve these surpluses in the medium term. A similar rationale applies to Colombia, Peru and Turkey. Therefore, for those countries the (lower) average from 1996-01 is used. The nominal interest rate-growth rate differential (r-g) is chosen to 1pp for each country. However, using market-data-based country-specific values from Topalova and Nyberg (2010) does not make a significant difference. Commodity exporters Other exporters  The baseline scenario fixes the primary balance at its historical value and takes the growth rate projections from the IMF's World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. This WEO database already assumes that after the crisis the growth rates are permanently lower than before the crisis.  Scenario 1 calculates the required primary balance if the countries try to reach a debt target.
These debt targets are: (i) to reduce its debt to 40 percent of GDP by 2020 if debt stock is above 40 percent of GDP at end-2009, or (ii) to permanently stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio if the debt is already below 40 percent of GDP at end-2009. 20 Comparing the required primary balances going forward to the country's historical values shows the extent to which a country needs to adjust its primary balance to reach its desired debt target.  Scenario 2 is similar to scenario 1, but it assumes that the crisis will be prolonged further and these countries will need to continue to implement expansionary policies as they did in 2007-09 period, thereby leading to additional debt accumulation. It then estimates the required primary balance if a country still aims to achieve the same debt target as under scenario 1 but this time by the year 2020.  Scenario 3 examines a more gradual approach towards adjusting the primary balances in each country so as to reach their debt target (as specified under scenario 1). This may be necessary for some countries if the required fiscal adjustment under the earlier two scenarios may be very large and/or might not be politically feasible to implement (or might fuel further instability and, perhaps, a new downturn because of insufficient aggregate demand without such stimulus programs).
Baseline
Under the baseline scenario, with the primary balance set to the historical average, public debt in 2020 is expected to increase further for a number of countries, in particular in the countries with the highest public debt at end-2009, Egypt, Hungary, India. Despite using a lower primary balance for Chile and Nigeria, public debt will decline and become negative during the projection period -which could be interpreted as an accumulation of fiscal assets (Figure 18 ).
In the cases of Colombia, Peru and Turkey, although these countries are not among the major commodity exporters, their average primary surplus during the period 2002-07 was much higher than what they have achieved between 1996 and 2001. Although this might indeed signal fiscal policy improvements, a key question will be whether these countries will be able to maintain such fiscal surpluses in a post-crisis world if commodity prices and global growth declines. Hence, for the baseline scenario for those countries, the historical primary fiscal balance is assumed to be represented by their 1996-2001 average primary fiscal balance. Under this scenario, the countries decide to set a specific public debt target to be achieved by 2020. The reason one may want to do this might be to account for the effect of the political cycle on debt, to commit future governments to maintain debt sustainability, or to benefit from the "announcement effect" with a view to assure capital markets that their debt is sustainable and that the crisis response programs are indeed temporary. In particular, under this scenario these selected countries are assumed adopt one of two debt targets: ( Under this target Chile, China, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, Russia, South Africa and Ukraine will face the stabilization target. The remaining countries will face the debt reduction target.
Under the baseline growth projection, the primary fiscal balance required to achieve the target is lower than the historical primary balance for Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, South Africa and Turkey. Hence, no unusual fiscal adjustment would be needed for those countries. China would have to achieve a higher primary balance than its historical balance, but given its low level of public debt at end-2009, its debt would still be below 40 percent of GDP if it continued to achieve its historical primary balance. Large adjustments of the primary balance are needed in Argentina, Egypt, Hungary, India and Poland.
Although a permanently lower GDP growth rate and higher world interest rates would increase the required adjustment, their effect on the required adjustment is smaller than the debt target itself.
21
However, these shocks would mean that for countries like Mexico, Peru, Philippines and Turkey, they will now have to adjust their primary fiscal balances to achieve the debt target ( Figure 19 ).
How can this fiscal adjustment take place? Each country will have to choose between cutting public spending or increasing government revenue, or both. A lot will depend on the pace of recovery of fiscal revenues in each country, which in turn will depend on GDP growth; how high international interest rates 21 The lower growth rate case is ¾ of the baseline growth rate, while keeping the interest rate unchanged; and the higher interest rate case is 2 percentage points higher than the baseline, leading to an interest rate-growth rate differential of 3 percentage points. and exchange rates will be, how much pressure the ongoing higher social safety net expenditures by the governments (e.g. social security and health care spending) are already putting on their budgets; and the political feasibility of cutting key recurrent spending items in the budget. Uncertainties also remain for developing countries on the extent to which private sector consumption and investment demand will respond to the fiscal and monetary stimulus efforts and the inventory cycle. If the response is weaker than envisaged or should they be prematurely withdrawn, the recovery could stall. The additional debt accumulation in some counties and no decline in debt levels in the other countries in this sample, it will clearly become more difficult for most countries to achieve their 2020 targets under this scenario. Malaysia and Ukraine's debt target would switch from public debt stabilization under scenario 1 (as public debt was below 40 percent of GDP at end - For some countries, the difference between the historical primary balance and the required primary balance to reach the debt target may be deemed by policy makers to be very large so as to make it politically difficult (or perhaps credible) to implement. Fears that a further fiscal contraction in an already fragile macroeconomic and growth environment may fuel a new economic downturn in some countries could postpone these much needed efforts as well. Hence, under illustrative scenario 3, countries are assumed to take a more gradual approach to adjusting their primary balances so as to reach the same target in 2020 as under scenario 1. Specifically, the fiscal adjustment is now assumed to be limited to 2 percentage points of GDP each year.
Results suggest that for the majority of the countries in the sample, the required adjustment in the primary balance under scenario 1 is less than 2 percent of GDP. These countries can then adjust their primary balance entirely in 2010 and debt will be on a downward trajectory or stabilize immediately. For Hungary, India, Egypt, Argentina and Poland, the required adjustment is larger than 2 percent of GDP, so a gradual adjustment would take 5, 4, 4, 2 and 2 years respectively. In Egypt, Hungary and Poland debt would first increase during the adjustment (as their historical primary balance is very negative), and peak in 2010 or 2011 before declining ( Figure 21 ).The downside is that for a number of years these countries will have to borrow significant amounts to finance their deficits. Debt and fiscal sustainability will therefore need to be carefully monitored going forward. How much and at what terms these market access countries will be able to obtain financing will depend on the conditions of the financial markets for MICs, the credibility of their adjustment strategy, and the effective communication of this strategy to the market participants in a timely and credible manner. 
Conclusions
Favorable global conditions and policy improvements up to 2007 have strengthened the macroeconomic space of a large number of middle-income countries, especially commodity exporters, by accumulating foreign exchange reserves, reducing external and public debt, achieving low inflation and low fiscal deficits. Other countries were already weakened by 2007 due to high debt, high inflation or persistent deficits. This determined, in large part, the extent to which these countries responded to the global financial crisis. The most acute phase of the crisis may be behind us, but if the fiscal interventions that were undertaken in the aftermath of the crisis are to continue, in the face of high debt levels and slow recovery in the highincome countries, and with the possibility of increasing world interest rates and shortening maturities for developing country new borrowings, the MICs need to pay careful attention to the sustainability and composition of their debt levels (domestic and external). Monitoring and managing the risks associated with their debt portfolios (interest rate, currency and commodity price risks) on a continuous basis will be crucial. Finally, they need to maintain a credible debt management and financing strategies to support their fiscal spending and post-crisis fiscal adjustment intentions. While traditional external debt sustainability analyses will continue to be an important ingredient of the analytical toolkit, it needs to be supplemented by a closer examination of public debt (domestic and external) and medium-term fiscal sustainability analyses by the respective authorities on an ongoing basis. Special attention should also be given to monitoring and managing the fiscal risks posed by the array of contingent liabilities incurred by governments in the context of their recent response to the global financial crisis. This will minimize the risk to governments, who may have made commendable efforts to rein in their primary balances towards achieving their prudent debt targets to better manage unforeseen calls on fiscal resources due to some contingent liability from a source that may be "too big to fail".
